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Abstract
We  apply  propensity  score  matching  to  the  estimation  of  differential  school 
effectiveness  between the  publicly  funded private  sector  and the  public  one,  in  a 
sample of 26 countries. This technique allows us to distinguish between school choice 
and school effectiveness processes and thus, to account for selectivity issues involved 
in the comparison of the two. Concerning school choice, we found two patterns: a 
choice  of  the  upwardly  mobile  parents  for  private  schools  and  a  preference  for 
segregation  by (lower-)  middle  class  parents.  As regards  school  effectiveness,  our 
results indicate that, after controlling for selectivity, a substantial advantage in reading 
achievement remains among students in publicly funded private schools in ten out of 
the 26 countries. 
Keywords:  school  choice;  school  effectiveness;  private-dependent  and  public 
schools; international comparison.
1. Introduction
The differences in scholastic achievement of public and private schools have been the 
topic  of  a  large  number  of  studies  in  the  educational  sciences,  sociology  and 
economics,  mostly  in  the  USA  but  also  to  some  extent  in  Europe.  Within  this 
literature, a significant distinction emerges inside the private sector, namely between 
private-dependent  (i.e.  publicly  financed)  and  private  independent  schools.  The 
distinction is important for at least three reasons. Firstly, in many countries, especially 
in  continental  Europe,  these  two types  of  schools  exist  alongside  each  other  and 
alongside public schools, often as an unintended outcome of the 19th century struggle 
around school ownership and financing between the State and Church(es). Secondly, 
the functions that these types of schools fulfil can differ significantly, depending on 
the  social,  religious  or  ethnic  groups  that  charter  them.  Thirdly,  the  distinction 
between  public  schools  and  private  government-dependent  schools  also  relates  to 
current policy debates about the organization, provision and financing of collective 
goods like education. 
Since  the ‘80s,  Anglo-Saxon countries  have experienced a  renewed debate 
around  school  choice  and  school  effectiveness,  on  the  backdrop  of  resurging 
neoliberal ideas. Parental choice and state-funded private schools are often advocated 
in the United States as a means of introducing competition for pupils among schools 
and decreasing the level of bureaucracy,  thereby improving the quality of teaching 
and reducing the cost of education (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Another argument used in 
the American context states that schools should offer young people an education that 
is in accordance with the way of life of their parents. This latter line of reasoning 
comes closer to the European tradition of government  dependent religious schools 
(Godwin & Kemerer,  2002).  The  developments  taking  place  in  the  United  States 
influenced the discourse on the relation between public and private schools in Europe 
(especially in the UK and Scandinavia, where fully subsidized private schools were 
rare, but also in countries like Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands where 
subsidized private schools had been established long before the rise of the neoliberal 
discourse on the effectiveness of public and private schools). 
Due to its implications for educational policy,  any differential  effectiveness 
between  private  and  public  schools  constitutes  an  important  research  topic.  The 
debate started with the study of Coleman, Hoffer & Kilgore (1982), who claimed that 
pupils  attending  Catholic  schools  in  the  USA  achieved  at  higher  levels  than 
comparable students in the public sector. This study was the start of a huge and still 
ongoing debate and research in the USA on public and private schools, subsidized 
chartered schools, potential state subsiding of religious schools and parental school 
choice.  Coleman  and Hoffer  (1987)  and  Bryk,  Lee  and  Holland  (1993)  provided 
comprehensive  follow-up  studies.  Meanwhile,  Dronkers  (2004)  reviewed  the 
empirical evidence of scholastic achievement differences among public, Catholic and 
Protestant schools in Europe. 
A less clamorous line of debate  on public and private schools is centered on 
the survival (or even the rise) of religious schools in continental Europe (but also in 
Australia).  Despite  the  decreasing  relevance  of  church  and  religion  in  daily  life 
experienced by most European societies, religious schools have not dwindled away 
throughout  Europe.  On  the  contrary,  the  religious  school  sector  in  largely  or 
increasingly  secular  states  is  either  growing  or  strongly  over-represented  (France: 
Langouët and Leger 1994; Germany: Dronkers,  Baumert & Schwippert, 2006; The 
Netherlands:  Dijkstra,  Dronkers  &  Karsten  2004).  This  holds  not  only  for  those 
societies  where  such  religious  schools  were  present  traditionally  (France,  the  old 
German  Länder,  The  Netherlands)  but  also  for  those  societies  in  which  religious 
schools  had  been  abolished  during  the  communist  regimes  (like  Hungary,  see 
Dronkers & Robert, 2004). This trend might be explained by relating it to a possible 
higher teaching effectiveness of religious schools compared to public ones. Whereas 
religious  schools might  have abandoned or relegated  the religious  socialization  of 
their pupils, they might still try to reach more non-cognitive educational goals that are 
valued  by  non-religious  parents  as  well.  A  better  educational  administration,  a 
stronger  value-oriented  community encompassing  parents  and schools  and a  more 
deliberate  selection  policy  of  religious  schools  might  be  the  most  important 
mechanisms  in  producing the  higher  average  effectiveness  of  religious  schools  in 
Europe.
2. Public-private comparisons
Comparisons between the achievement of students in private and the public schools 
have been carried out mainly on a national basis. In the US, research based on the 
High School  and Beyond and  on the  National  Education  Longitudinal  Study,  has 
generated heated controversies about whether private, in particular Catholic, schools 
were able to raise the achievement of the pupils more than the public schools (Greeley 
1982; Noell  1982; Alexander and Pallas 1983; Willms 1985; Coleman and Hoffer 
1987; Chubb and Moe 1990; Gamoran 1996; Neal 1997; Hoffer 1998; Jeynes 2002). 
However, few consistent findings have been yielded. Results have depended on the 
timing of the study, on the particular research design and included variables and on 
the precise statistical methods used. 
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Despite  the  prevalence  of  publicly  funded  private  schooling  in  Europe, 
evidence on the extent to which private schools on the continent have been more or 
less  effective  in  bringing  about  higher  cognitive  outcomes  is  relatively  scarce. 
Nonetheless, some studies have indicated a potential advantage of attending a private-
dependent  or  a  religious  school  in  Netherlands  (Koopman  and  Dronkers  1994; 
Dijkstra, Dronkers et al. 1997; Sturm, Groenendijk et al. 1998), France (Langouët and 
Leger 1994) and Germany (Dronkers, Baumert et al. 2002; Dronkers and Hemsing 
2005) on measures such as test scores, dropout and graduation rates. However, the 
private-dependent school advantage was far from straightforward (often depending in 
contextual circumstances) and often could not be replicated using different datasets. 
The analyses of the effectiveness differences between private and public schools are 
outside Europe and the USA more rare, although it is an emerging scientific literature 
in Latin-America (Somers, McEwan & Willms, 2004)
Although  the  differences  in  scholastic  achievement  between  public  and 
private-dependent schools are relevant for nearly all developed countries, little cross-
national research has looked into these differences in a comparative way. Making use 
of  the  PISA  2000  survey,  Dronkers  & Robert  (2008a;  2008b)  have  conducted  a 
systematic comparison of the effectiveness of public, private-dependent and private-
independent schools in 22 OECD countries. Their analysis has found that, albeit the 
larger part of the gross scholastic achievement differences between public and private-
dependent schools can be explained by differences in their student intake and by the 
related differences in school composition, private government-dependent schools still 
have a higher net scholastic achievement in reading than comparable public schools 
with  the  same  students,  parents  and  social  composition.  Moreover,  the  private-
dependent sector advantage was found to be universal, meaning that it was more or 
less equal in the various countries. 
Dronkers & Robert  (2008a; 2008b) also showed that the effects of private-
dependent  schools  on  educational  performance  deviate  from  those  of  private 
independent schools. This underlines that it is an error to lump private-dependent and 
private independent schools together as schools operating under comparable market-
circumstances:  positive and negative effect of both types  will  neutralize eachother 
(this mistake is made by for instance Vandenberghe & Robin (2004) in their analysis 
of the PISA 2000 data and by Somers, McEwan & Willms (2004) in their analysis of 
Latin-American private schools).  
Another  analysis  of  the  same PISA 2000 data  (Corten  & Dronkers,  2006) 
suggests  that  private  government-dependent  schools  are  more  effective  for  pupils 
from families with low levels of cultural possessions. They found no indication that 
private government-dependent schools were more favourable for children from higher 
social strata.
3. Unmeasured selectivity of school choice and school effectiveness
The literature on the possible  causes of scholastic  achievement  differences  among 
schools is extensive. Although we cannot discuss at length this literature, we point out 
some  useful  overviews  (Sammons,  Hillman,  &  Mortimore,  1995;  Scheerens  & 
Bosker,  1997;  Teddlie  & Reynolds,  2000).  The  main  problem encountered  when 
trying  to  assess  the  school  effects  on  achievement  resides  in  the  unknown  and 
therefore, unmeasured selectivity involved in opting for a private school instead of a 
public  one.  Indeed,  a  number  of  studies  have  pointed  out  that  private  and public 
school  students  differ  in  substantial  ways  such as  parental  education,  income and 
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wealth,  educational  resources present at  home,  parental  involvement  in the pupil’s 
educational career, and so on (Coleman, Hoffer et al. 1982; Greeley 1982; Coleman 
and Hoffer 1987; Witte 2000; Yang and Kayaardi 2004; Goldring and Phillips 2008). 
More generally,  when attendance  of  a  school,  whether  public  or  private,  is  ‘free’ 
meaning  both  parental  and  school  selection  occur  before  a  student  can  enrol, 
selectivity is always an issue. Wealthier, better informed, and better educated parents 
will  presumably have an advantage in  finding and in  gaining access  to  the ‘best’ 
school for their child (Ball 1993; Ball, Bowe et al. 1995; Echols and Willms 1995; 
Ball 1997; Goyette 2008; Jarvis and Alvanides 2008).
Analyses  in  the  school  effectiveness  tradition  (Dronkers  & Robert  (2008a; 
2008b) follow that tradition) assume that the measured parental and pupil variables 
will control for any selectivity induced by school choice processes. This assumption 
seems appropriate  when comparing  the effectiveness  of public  schools within and 
across countries, as most often public schools have fixed catchment-areas and involve 
virtually no parental school choice, aside from the indirect choice of residence. 
But this assumption is questionable if it is applied to the choice between public 
and private schools, even in societies in which the choice between public and private 
government-dependent  schools  is  hardly  influenced  by  school  fees  (as  in  the 
Netherlands). A host of factors associated with parental and student background might 
be linked to both choice processes and outcomes, and this almost surely brings about 
unmeasured  heterogeneity,  which  might  or  not  might  be  solved  by the  measured 
parental and pupil variables. More generally, the fact that both parents and schools are 
relatively  unconstrained  in  picking  a  school  or  a  student  amplifies  self-selection 
problems.
To address the issue of selectivity,  we propose a another approach, namely 
propensity  score  matching  to  explicitly  disentangle  school  choice  processes  from 
school-effectiveness. In a first step, we estimate the likelihood of choosing a private-
dependent  school  rather  than  a  public  one.  The  result  assigns  to  each  pupil  a 
propensity  score  of  choosing  a  private  rather  than  a  public  school,  based  on  the 
characteristics of the pupil,  her parents and the features of the chosen school. The 
second step of the approach consists  of estimating the effectiveness  of non-public 
schools, based on a matched sample of pupils with similar propensities of choosing a 
private school but who nonetheless attended a public one.
In this article, we focus on the choice between public and private-dependent 
schools (private schools which get their financial resources mainly from the national, 
regional or local governments of their country) and on the corresponding differences 
in school effectiveness in the cognitive domain (reading)2. 
4.  Another  approach  to  disentangle  the  relations  between  choice  and 
effectiveness 
To distinguish between school choice and school effectiveness processes, we employ 
a technique called propensity score matching.3 It has been used for several decades in 
other fields, particularly in economics (see Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, for one of the 
original pieces in this method and Dehejia & Sadek, 2002, for a more recent review). 
The  technique  approximates  a  quasi-experimental  design  with  secondary  data  by 
comparing individuals in a “treatment group” (in this case, pupils in private schools) 
to those in a “control group” (pupils in public schools) who have a similar likelihood 
of  experiencing  the  treatment  according  to  observable  characteristics.  This 
comparison is accomplished by using a logistic regression to estimate the propensity 
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that the pupil will choose a private school. The propensity score is defined as follows 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983):
P(T) ≡ Pr {T = 1‌‌‌‌/S} = E{T/S}
where p(T) is the propensity of choosing a private school, T indicates that the pupil 
did or did not choose a private school (the treatment) and S is a vector of covariates 
influencing the private school choice. 
The resulting propensity score is used to match4 pupils who did with those that 
did  not  choose private  schools,  our  treatment  and control  groups.  Students  in  the 
treatment  group  that  could  not  be  matched  based  on  their  propensity  score  are 
discarded  from subsequent  analyses.  The  mean  estimated  difference  in  academic 
achievement between the matched treatment and control groups represents the effect 
of  attending  a  private  school  on  achievement  for  students  with  propensity  scores 
within  the  range of  the  matched  sample,  i.e.  the  average  treatment  effect  for  the 
treated. 
We want to stress that propensity score matching techniques are not a “magic 
bullet”. They only account well for selection if two assumptions are met. First, all 
observable variables influencing both the treatment – school choice - and the outcome 
– academic achievement- must be included in the propensity score model, i.e. there 
has to be conditional independence. Second, selection processes have to be captured 
well by variables predicting the propensity to experience the treatment of interest. But 
these issues arise no matter what method one uses, even the simplest.  Thus, when 
comparing  different  modeling  strategies,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  every 
method has its own limitations. OLS regression analysis (which is most commonly 
used  in  school  effectiveness  analysis,  multi-level  models  included)  estimates  the 
average  treatment  effect  of  private  school  attendance  for  the  full  sample  when 
controlling for the other covariates. Propensity score matching restricts the available 
sample to treated and untreated cases that have comparable propensity scores. If there 
is no considerable overlap in the propensities of those in the treatment and the control 
group (like in most of our countries) the differences in educational achievement will 
not  reflect  the  average  treatment  effect  of  attending  a  private  school  for  the  full 
sample, but only for a selective part, namely those pupils who have the possibility to 
actually choose a private school. From this perspective, the results of propensity score 
matching  presented  here  should  be  seen  as  complementary  to  the  earlier  results, 
obtained through OLS regression.
The great advantage of using propensity scores lies in the fact that matching is 
performed  on  only  one  dimension  instead  of  the  all  the  variables  on  which  the 
propensity score is computed (in this case, 15 pupil and school variables). Because of 
the large number of predictors, matching on all of the variables simultaneously would 
be virtually impossible.  However, the same propensity score may result from very 
different values on the predictor variables entered in the logistic regression through 
which  the  propensity  score  is  estimated.5 To  account  for  this  possibility,  a  more 
sophisticated  propensity  matching  has  been  performed  using  both  the  propensity 
scores and the Mahalanobis distance. The algorithm involves two steps. The first one 
consists of selecting all the control cases (in this case, pupils attending public schools) 
that have a propensity score within a range of a quarter of a standard deviation below 
or  above  each  treatment  case  (in  this  case,  pupils  attending  private-dependent 
schools). In a second step, for all the selected control cases in the previous stage, a 
Mahalanobis distance is computed based on five variables (highest parental education, 
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highest parental  occupational status, family wealth, immigration status and cultural 
possessions  index).  These  five  variables  have  been  chosen  based  on  theoretical 
considerations,  i.e.  they are thought to play a particularly important  role in school 
choice selectivity (Ball 1993; Gorard 1999; Witte 2000). Eventually, the control case 
with the lowest Mahalanobis distance is chosen as a match. This type of matching 
allows for a greater weight to be assigned to the variables included in the Mahalanobis 
distance  matching.  Simultaneously,  it  ensures  that  pupils  attending  public  schools 
match (as close as possible) pupils attending private-dependent schools not only on 
the propensity scores but also on the five social background variables on which the 
Mahalanobis distance is computed.
There are very few applications of propensity score matching in the study of 
the effects of private and public schools, but the first dates back more than 20 years 
and is used for the same topic: effectiveness differences between public and catholic 
schools in the USA (Hoffer, Greeley and Coleman, 1985; Morgan, 2001).
5. Data and Methods
Our analyses are carried out using the PISA survey. This dataset has the particular 
advantage of offering information both on school boards and funding sources. Thus, it 
enables the distinction between all of the three school types mentioned above, namely 
public,  private  government  independent  and private  government  dependent.6 Other 
data-sets like TIMSS and PRILS allow only for the distinction between public and 
private schools and are, thus, less useful given the already established differences in 
effectiveness  between  private  government-independent  and  private  government-
dependent schools (Dronkers & Robert, 2008a). We restrict ourselves in this article to 
the comparison between public and private-dependent schools. 
Three waves of the PISA survey have been carried out so far, in 2000, 2003 
and  in  2006.  Use  has  been  made  of  all  three  waves  by  pooling  them  into  one 
database.7 This  strategy  allows  us  to  maximize  the  number  of  private-dependent 
schools  present  in  the  database.  We  selected  all  the  countries  in  Europe,  other 
industrialized countries, Latin-America & Asia that have a minimum of 10 schools 
per category. We also delete all countries in which the private-dependent schools cater 
for less that 1 percent of the pupil population.8 
We use only the score on the reading test as indicator of students’ indicator of 
his or her educational performance. The reading performance is measured in all the 
three waves fully, while the scores of the mathematic or sciences tests only partly or 
in fewer waves. Earlier analyses (compare the results of Dronkers & Robert (2008a) 
who use  reading  as  indicator  with  Dronkers  & Robert  (2008b)  who use  math  as 
indicator) have shown that the parameters of private and public schools do not vary 
substantially between these three indicators of educational performance.
The PISA data are cross-sectional data and they have no information about the 
length of the stay of the pupils at the current school, or about the characteristics of 
former schools of the students. This might lead to a misspecification of the effect of 
the  characteristics  of  the  current  school,  especially  if  all  15  year  old  pupils  in  a 
specific country have moved recently to another school.       
Based on existing literature comparing private and public schools, as well as 
on availability of comparable data in the three waves of PISA, a variety of family and 
school characteristics likely to influence school choice and school effectiveness have 
been  included  in  the  analyses.  Gender,  immigrant  status,  cultural  possessions, 
household wealth, both maternal and paternal education and occupational status have 
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been incorporated to account for family background variation in the population of 
private and public schools. These students and parental characteristics were the most 
powerful in earlier analysis with the PISA data, while parental income (separate from 
household  wealth)  is  not  available  in  PISA.  The  school’s  social  composition 
(percentage of students having at least a parent with a university degree), the school’s 
size, its admission policies (whether it considers parental endorsement of the school’s 
educational  philosophy  and  attendance  of  its  special  programs  as  criteria  when 
admitting  students),  as  well  as  variables  related  to  the  visible  school’s  resources, 
namely  student-teacher  ratios,  computer-student  ratios  and  a  composite  index  of 
educational  resources have been considered as potential  factors influencing school 
choice on the school level.  All of the included school characteristics are relatively 
visible to parents and therefore may play a role in shaping choice decisions. We did 
not include those school characteristics, which are less visible for parents (like teacher 
quality), because their role in the parental school choice process is random due to its 
unobservablity  by  parents.   Finally,  to  gauge  the  potential  deterrent  effect  that 
financial costs of attending a school might have, a tuition variable, i.e. whether the 
school charges or not tuition fees has been included.
The characteristics of pupils, parents and schools of the countries with enough 
public and private-dependent schools are shown in table 1. 
 
[About here table 1] 
26 counties on four continents have enough public and private-dependent schools to 
be included in the analyses, although in some case, the private-dependent sector caters 
for a small percentage of all 15 year-olds (but always more than 1%). 
6. Results for the choice of private-dependent schools versus public schools.
A set of 26 logistic regression equations including all the parent, pupil and 
visible  school  characteristics  presented  in  section  5  has  been  used  to  predict  the 
selection  of a private-dependent  school rather  than a public  one,  for each country 
separately. 
Table 2 shows the regression coefficients of these equations.  Since we use 
multiple  regressions that simultaneously include all  of the predictors,  the resulting 
coefficients can be interpreted as ‘net’ effects on the school choice.
[About here table 2] 
The  results  indicate  that,  in  general,  the  choice  pattern  between  private-
dependent and public schools differs across these 26 countries. Admission based on 
parents’  endorsement  of  the  school’s  philosophy  is  positively  influencing  the 
likelihood of choosing a private-dependent school in all countries, with the exception 
of  Finland,  Sweden and Indonesia.  Parental  endorsement  figures  in  the  admission 
policies  of  all  private-dependent  schools  in  France  and  Norway,  therefore  a 
coefficient could not be computed for this variable in these two countries. Admission 
policies  based on participation in a special  program are favouring the choice of a 
public school in nearly all countries, except in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Argentina, Chile, Indonesia where such policies increase the chance of a 
private-dependent school option.9 A high score on the socio-economic composition of 
the  student-body  variable  increases  the  chance  of  attending  a  private-dependent 
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school except in France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Korea  and  Thailand  where  it  either  has  no  effect  or  it  actually  increases  the 
probability of a public school choice.  A higher number of teachers  per student  in 
schools impacts positively10 on the likelihood of selecting a private-dependent school 
only in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Norway, but the same variable increases 
the  odds  of  public  school  option  in  Germany,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, Chile, Indonesia and Korea. The payment 
of tuition is positively associated with choice of a private-dependent school in most 
countries,  but it  clearly represents an obstacle  to  private  school  choice  in France, 
Hungary, Italy and Portugal. 
The gender of the pupil matters in the selection of a given school type in a substantial 
number  of  countries.  Parents  with  a  male  child  tend  to  choose  private-dependent 
schools  more  often  in  Austria,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Argentina, Korea and Thailand, while they will prefer a public school in 
Italy and Chile. Native parents11 choose more frequently private-dependent schools in 
Belgium, Canada and Hong Kong, but they prefer public schools in Finland, France, 
Italy, Norway, Sweden and Indonesia. Interestingly, the mother’s educational level is 
positively  related  to  choice  of  a  public  school  in  the  Czech  Republic  Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Hong Kong and Indonesia, while 
the father’s educational level is hardly significant.  The occupational status of both 
parents is positively related with the choice of a private-dependent school in Austria, 
Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Finland,  Germany,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Norway, 
Sweden,  Canada and Hong Kong,  but  in  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and Korea higher 
parental occupational status is linked with the choice of a public school.
[About here figure 1]
Based on this huge variation in factors which affect the choice between public and 
private-dependent  schools  in  the  various  countries,  easy characterisations,  such as 
choice always being driven by class, educational capital, fear of immigrants, wealth, 
school resources or selectivity, are simply misleading. In an attempt to systematize the 
variation in the effects of various pupil and school characteristics across countries, we 
have made use cluster analysis, using the country regression coefficients12 as input. 
Figure 2 shows the country groupings that have emerged from the cluster analysis.13 
Countries  where  coefficients  are  more  similar  are  clustered  closer  together,  while 
countries with more divergent coefficients are placed further away from each other. 
The cluster analysis suggests the existence of two clusters 14. The first cluster consists 
of  Austria,  Ireland,  Czech  Republic,  Finland,  Denmark,  Germany,  Sweden, 
Switzerland and Hong Kong. Table 3 shows that the private-dependent  schools in 
these nine countries are chosen by pupils with more cultural  possessions at home, 
lower  educated  mothers  and  mothers  with  higher  occupational  status.  One  might 
characterize the private-dependent school-choice in these countries as the  choice of  
the upward mobile parents. The second cluster contains Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Thailand, Hungary, Slovakia, Israel, Italy, Spain, Chile and Korea. Table 3 
shows that the private-dependent schools in these eleven countries are chosen by male 
native pupils with less cultural possessions at home, higher educated mothers, parents 
with lower occupational  status,  and who are less likely to  pay tuition.  One might 
characterize the private-dependent  school-choice in these countries as a choice for 
segregation by (lower-) middle class parents. 
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[About here table 3]
The general conclusion of this section on the choice between private-dependent and 
public schools is that there is large variation between countries, much more than one 
might expect. Private-dependent school choice is not only or mostly based on opting 
for schools with the best teaching conditions (low student/staff ratio; a high socio-
economic  composition  of  the  student  body).  It  can  also  be  driven  by  defensive 
motives (avoiding immigrants, lower tuition). 
7.  The  effectiveness  in  reading  achievement  of  private-dependent  schools 
compared to that of public schools
In this section we present the results from the second step of the propensity score 
matching.  We  only  compare  pupils  who  have  a  more  or  less  equal  risks  or 
propensities  to  go to  a  private-dependent  versus a  public  school.  We delete  those 
pupils in private-dependent schools who have no comparable match among pupils in 
public schools. This leads to the loss of quite a large number of pupils in the sample, 
particularly  in  countries  where  the  private-dependent  sector  is  small  or  obviously 
skewed  towards  the  better-off  families.15 Table  4  summarizes  the  results  of  our 
analyses and the number of matched pupils.
[About here table 4] 
The first column gives the raw average difference in reading scores between pupils in 
private-dependent  schools  and  public  schools,  without  any  control  for  covariates. 
Given the school-choice selectivity discussed in section 6, it is no surprise that the 
pupils of private-dependent schools in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Argentina and Chile, have 
higher  readings  scores  on  average.  Quite  surprisingly  though,  pupils  of  private-
dependent schools in Italy, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Thailand score 
significantly lower compared to those in public schools. The second column gives the 
number of pupils involved in this simple comparison. Because these differences are 
not controlled for school-choice selectivity and parental background effects, they are 
not reflecting school effectiveness.
The  third  column  gives  the  average  difference  in  reading  scores  between 
pupils in private-dependent schools and public schools, but now only for those pupils 
from  both  school  types  who  fell  within  the  common  range  of  the  propensity  of 
choosing a private school in that country. Column 4 gives the number of pupils who 
fell within such a common range of propensity scores in that country. This number is 
(sometimes considerably) smaller than the full sample of pupils (column 2), because 
of the small overlap in propensity scores between the pupils in the private-dependent 
and  public  sector  respectively.  In  Luxembourg,  Sweden,  Canada,  Argentina  and 
Indonesia  the  drop  is  particularly  large,  while  in  Belgium,  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands this decrease is small. The average difference in reading scores tends to 
drop  when  applying  this  restriction,  but  substantial  differences  remain:  pupils  of 
private-dependent schools in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, 
Spain,  Sweden,  Canada,  Argentina  and Chile  still  have higher  readings  scores  on 
average, while pupils of private-dependent schools in Italy, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia and Thailand score significantly lower. 
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However, within a common range, the distributions of the propensity scores of 
pupils in private-dependent and public schools can be quite different and thus still 
produce biased results. Therefore, as a next step, we match each pupil attending a 
private-dependent school to one with a similar propensity score but attending a public 
school. Note that, the actual level of the propensity score is irrelevant for the making 
of the match, as long as the pupils of matched pair have the same propensity score 
(low or high), but attend different school types. This restriction strongly reduces the 
number of pupils/cases as can be seen in column 6, but the difference in reading score 
between the matched pupils (column 5) gives now a more valid indication of the true 
discrepancies in school effectiveness between private-dependent and public schools. 
The  only  significant  positive  differences  in  the  reading  score  between  pupils  of 
private-dependent schools and public schools are registered in Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Canada, Argentina, and 
Chile. Pupils of private-dependent schools in Austria and Thailand score significantly 
lower  than  their  counterparts  in  public  schools.  In  the  remaining  countries  the 
differences  in  the  reading  score  between  pupils  of  private-dependent  schools  and 
public schools is not significant. Note that this more strict control of the selectivity of 
school-choice  changed the  results  for  Austria  (became negative),  Czech Republic, 
Netherlands,  Portugal (became positive),  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Spain, Sweden, Hong 
Kong  and  Indonesia  (became  insignificant).  This  shows  that  controlling  for  the 
selectivity of school-choice is important for unmasking ‘true’ school effects. 
Although propensity score matching has the advantage of requiring matching 
on only one dimension,  i.e.  the propensity score,  it  has the drawback that  similar 
propensity scores can be the result of different combinations of parent, student and 
school characteristics. To further verify our results, we have used propensity score 
matching with Mahalanobis distance on a few key student background indicators. The 
Mahalanobis  distance  matching  allows  for  a  greater  weight  to  be assigned to  the 
variables on which the distance is computed. We chose to include five variables in the 
Mahalanobis  distance  computations,  namely  highest  parental  education,  highest 
parental  occupational  status,  family  wealth,  immigration  status  and  cultural 
possessions index. This more refined analysis which combines matching on choice 
and additional controls for the five covariates (column 7) does not change the results 
much, compared with the analysis based on simple nearest neighbour propensity score 
matching (column 5). After applying this (stricter) form of control for school-choice 
induced  selectivity,  significant  positive  differences  in  the  reading  score  between 
pupils of private-dependent and public schools persist in Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Germany,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Canada,  Argentina,  and  Chile.  Pupils  of 
private-dependent schools in Finland, Italy,  Korea and Thailand score significantly 
lower  than  pupils  in  public  schools.  In  the  remaining  thirteen  countries,  the 
differences in reading scores between pupils of the two sectors are not significant. 
Note that different  (stricter)  method of control for the selectivity of school-choice 
changed the results for Austria and Netherlands (became insignificant), as well as for 
Finland, Italy and Korea (became negative). 
Finally, no apparent relationship could be established between school choice 
and  school  effectiveness  processes  (Table  4).  Both  clusters  derived  based  on  the 
choice patterns contained countries with a more effective private-dependent sector, as 
well as countries where the public sector is more successful in raising the achievement 
outcomes of its pupils.
9. School Choice and School Effectiveness 
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Propensity  score  matching  can  provide  a  useful  tool  to  differentiate  between  the 
effects of school choice and those of school effectiveness. Making this distinction is 
crucial for a valid estimation of the school sector differentials in effectiveness, i.e. the 
gains  in  achievement  that  are  brought  about  by  the  school  itself  rather  than  a 
consequence of its student intake. 
The choice of private-dependent schools in these 26 countries varies by school 
characteristics, especially school composition, school-size, its admission criteria (both 
parental endorsement of the school’s values and participation in special programs), 
tuition  payment  and  educational  resources.  We  found  two  patterns  of  private- 
dependent  school  choice.  The  first  one  can  be  characterized  as  a  choice  of  the  
upwardly mobile parents for private schools. The second one might be pictured as a 
preference for  segregation by (lower-) middle class parents, through the use of the 
private-dependent sector.
We  have  also  found  large  variation  in  school  sector  related  effectiveness 
across countries. After having taken into account the differences between the private-
dependent and public sectors generated by school choice processes, pupils at private-
dependent schools in ten countries (Belgium, Czech Republic,  Germany,  Hungary, 
Ireland,  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Canada,  Argentina,  and  Chile)  still  achieved 
significantly higher than their counterparts in the public sector. Their observed higher 
reading scores cannot be explained by the school choice processes and this might be 
an indication of a higher effectiveness of private-dependent schools in these countries. 
However in Austria and Thailand (thus a small  minority of the countries studied), 
pupils  at  private-dependent  schools  have  lower  reading  scores  than  pupils  in  the 
public sector. Thus, in these two cases, the school choice processes hide the actual 
lower  effectiveness  of  private-dependent  schools,  compared  to  the  higher 
effectiveness  of  the  public  sector.  Religious  or  ethnic  motives  might  explain  the 
parental preference for private-dependent schools, despite their lower effectiveness. 
Our findings contradict neoliberal theories related to school choice and school 
effectiveness  at  least  on  two  counts.  On  the  one  hand,  we  could  not  find  any 
correlation,  at  the  country  level,  between  school  choice  and  school  effectiveness 
patterns.  The  lack  of  a  choice-effectiveness  link  contradicts  the  existence  of  a 
universal consumer logic operating in school markets, whereby parents always choose 
the most effective schools for their children. In fact, in a number of countries parents 
chose to send their children to a private-dependent school despite the lower success of 
this type of schools in raising achievement. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  could  not  find  any  universal  private-dependent 
schooling advantage. On the contrary, in the majority of the countries included in the 
analyses  (Denmark,  Finland, France,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Norway,  Slovakia,  Spain, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  Israel,  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia  and  Korea),  we  found  no 
significant difference between the scores of pupils of private-dependent and public 
schools. These results also deviate from those of Dronkers & Robert (2008a; 2008b). 
They  found,  using  a  usual  OLS  multi-level  regression  containing  corrections  for 
student background variables and school composition, that private-dependent schools 
were more effective than public schools in all countries. This finding is not confirmed 
in this study, as higher achievement scores in the private-dependent sector emerged 
only for a (large) minority of the countries studied. However, our study contains a 
wider variation of countries than the range Dronkers and Robert (2008a) analyzed. 
But the findings of our study also indicate that we cannot simply dismiss the 
higher  effectiveness  of  private-dependent  schools,  at  least  in  some  countries,  by 
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referring  solely  to  the  selectivity  argument.  Private-dependent  schools  remain 
significantly more effective than comparable public schools, in a substantial number 
of countries, even after complex adjustments and controls for their student intake.
 Cross-national variation in both choice and effectiveness patterns related to 
the  publicly  funded  private  sector  points  to  the  potential  role  played  by  country 
specific  institutional  and  social  factors.  Dissimilarities  in  the  legal  framework 
regulating the private-dependent schooling sector,  as well as the general education 
system containing  it,  give rise  to divergent  opportunities  and constraints  to  which 
private-dependent schools must adapt. In turn, the legal framework is often the result 
of prolonged social and political processes with deep historical roots. Also differences 
in  religious  and  ethnic  composition  of  public  and  private  schools  in  the  various 
countries, which we could not take into account, might explain these cross-national 
variation  in  choice  and  effectiveness.  Moreover,  in  some  countries,  the  cleavage 
between  public  and  private-dependent  schools  might  be  deep  for  still  relevant 
historical reasons, while in other countries students move now easily from public to 
private-dependent schools, or back. 
Further cross-national  analyses are needed to pinpoint the exact institutions 
and  legacies  that  are  involved  in  moulding  both  school  choice  and  school 
effectiveness between the private and the public sectors. 
Notes
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Figure 1: Clusters of choice patterns of private-dependent schools versus public school  
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000, 2003 and 2006. Au=Austria;  Be=Belgium; CHI=Chile; 
CZ=Czech  Republic;  DK=Denmark;  ESP=Spain;  FI=Finland;  GE=Germany;  HK=Hong  Kong; 
ISR=Israel;  IT=Italy;  IRE=Ireland;  KOR=  Korea;  LUX=Luxembourg;  NED=Netherlands; 
PRT=Portugal; SK= Slovakia; SWE= Sweden; SWT= Switzerland; THA=Thailand; 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country
Austria Belgium Czech 
Republic 
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
Private independent 2,79 1,59 0,27 0,49 0 7,87 0,23 4,13 1,27 2,44 2,1
Private-dependent 6,52 67,58 4,64 22,09 4,43 14,24 5,48 0 8,82 57,52 2,91
Public 90,7 30,83 95,1 77,43 95,57 77,89 94,29 95,87 89,92 40,04 94,99
Gender (% girls) 49,77 48,2 49,63 50,66 50,87 50,74 50,21 50,18 48,47 50,56 50,58
Grade (average) 9,47 9,63 9,51 8,93 8,88 9,48 9,09 10,07 9,25 9,53 9,84
Grade (range) 6 to 11 7 to 12 6 to 10 7 to 11 7 to 10 7 to 11 6 to 11 7 to 11 6 to 11 7 to 12 7 to 11
Immigrant (% ) 17,39 22,47 7,92 13,44 4,46 24,03 18,85 12,12 3,74 15,5 8,22
First generation immigrant (%) 8,02 6,57 1,37 4,42 1,9 2,87 8,33 6,12 1,99 5,4 3,2
Second  generation  immigrant 
(%)
9,37 15,9 6,55 9,02 2,56 21,16 10,52 6 1,75 10,11 5,02
Foreign  language  used  at 
home (%)
8,27 13,6 0,85 4,89 1,45 5,12 7,71 2,99 0,74 1,22 12,1
Index  of  cultural  possessions 
(average)
0,01 -0,3 0,19 -0,08 0,12 -0,3 0,04 0,15 0,33 -0,17 0,22
Family wealth (average) 0,26 0,14 -0,28 0,57 0,36 -0,15 0,32 -0,28 -0,38 0,09 -0,01
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Austria Belgium Czech 
Republic
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
ISCED 0/1 Mother education 2,47 5,87 0,78 2,76 3,65 3,19 4,59 9,51 0,7 5,4 5,46
ISECD 2 7,49 7,65 2,59 8,55 11,3 4,87 11,05 19,07 9,51 14,94 29,17
ISECD 3 b, c 38,46 8,77 19,17 11,42 4,49 23,98 22,08 7,86 17,63 8,08 11,61
ISCED 3a, 4 27,38 25,56 42,48 20,67 24,39 20,36 34,46 26,64 35,22 31,55 30,44
ISCED 5 b 13,61 27,61 15,81 34,66 27,69 15,14 9,2 14,8 17,24 21,36 10,71
ISCED 5a, 6 10,59 24,54 19,16 21,94 28,48 32,45 18,63 22,13 19,7 18,67 12,12
ISCED 0/1 Father education 1,71 5,46 0,63 3,09 5,82 2,85 3,85 11,03 0,73 8,16 6,31
ISECD 2 5,8 7,12 1,72 9,26 13,73 5,35 9,9 18,11 5,9 18,96 28,58
ISECD 3 b, c 34,03 7,73 24,07 20,47 4,65 21,61 18,21 9,38 22,81 8,46 9,19
ISCED 3a, 4 21,45 26,66 39,12 23,29 27,8 24,01 27,38 21,98 38,9 27,72 32,32
ISCED 5 b 21,61 22,44 11,28 22,34 22,05 9,7 12,85 12,49 13,5 17,62 9,73
ISCED 5a, 6 15,4 30,59 23,18 21,55 25,96 36,49 27,81 27,01 18,15 19,08 13,86
Mother SES (average) 41,82 43,67 45,77 42,77 43,06 42,57 43,28 45,02 45,97 43,7 43,44
Father SES (average) 44,31 46,1 44,68 44,7 44,66 44,11 45,13 43,6 41,17 42,77 42,78
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Austria Belgium Czech 
Republic
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
value reading (average) 496,14 510,72 504,43 494,43 545,29 503,2 497,22 467,11 483,16 521,05 485,83
Girl schools% 1,79 0,35 0,35 0 0 0 2,49 0,14 0,72 25,77 0,1
Boy schools% 1,15 0,92 1,57 0,01 0 0 0,16 0,45 3,09 18,52 1,41
Mixed schools % 97,06 98,73 98,08 99,99 100 100 97,35 99,42 96,19 55,71 98,49
Social  composition  (%  parent's 
having  tertiary  education)-
(average)
19,04 36,57 29,43 31,06 37,82 44,08 32,12 34,09 25,69 27,62 18,96
School size 586,45 693,13 508,38 440,38 382,9 892,09 666,62 284,12 511,49 564,67 664,88
Tuition % having tuition fees 72,96 61,64 32,53 31,81 1,57 68,59 31 37,54 24,87 51,63 94,51
Admittance-parent's  views 
considered -%
45,85 71,92 54,13 54,26 47,85 91,85 49,55 34,54 62,47 70,26 35,1
Admittance-special  programs 
considered- %
79,26 69,96 80,89 65,04 66,73 100 74,48 61,22 88,38 66,7 76,89
Teacher-student ratio 12,23 9,49 14,93 11,53 11 12,55 17,55 9,43 10,88 14,22 8,97
Computer-student ratio (average) 0,22 0,15 0,11 0,19 0,16 0,13 0,08 0,08 0,21 0,1 0,17
Educational resources (average) 0,21 -0,09 -0,11 -0,1 -0,01 -0,49 0,16 0,16 -0,07 -0,09 0,21
Teacher  shortage  -neg  scale 
(average)
-0,49 0,22 -0,15 -0,19 -0,3 -0,32 0,21 0,18 -0,38 -0,15 0,14
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland Canada Israel
Private independent 0 0 0 2,1 0,29 6,9 0 2,89 3,66 5,44
Private-dependent 13,52 73,31 1,27 6,17 8,51 35,66 5,05 0,87 2,81 17,19
Public 86,48 26,69 98,73 91,73 91,2 57,44 94,95 96,24 93,53 77,37
Gender (% girls) 50,1 49,31 49,1 52,41 49,3 50,57 49,05 48,89 50,72 53,03
Grade (average) 9,15 9,47 9,99 9,36 9,59 9,67 8,99 8,84 9,82 9,9
Grade (range) 7 to 11 7 to 12 8 to 11 5 to 11 7 to 11 7 to 11 7 to 10 7 to 12 7 to 12 7 to 12
Immigrant (%) 48,05 17,64 12,94 12,26 6,4 7,43 20,28 36,99 18,7 38,09
First  generation 
immigrant (%)
17,44 4,4 4,26 3,31 0,66 3,63 6,1 12,15 5,55 10,72
Second  generation 
immigrant (%)
30,61 13,24 8,68 8,96 5,74 3,8 14,18 24,46 13,15 27,36
Foreign  language 
used at home (%)
22,43 11,37 5,09 1,66 0,9 1,58 7,45 12,96 6,23 11,08
Index cultural 
possessions 
(Average)
-0,03 -0,32 0,2 -0,09 0,37 0,18 0,08 -0,25 -0,09 0,06
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland Canada Israel
Family  wealth 
(Average)
0,38 0,43 0,68 -0,06 -0,38 -0,01 0,62 0,1 0,28 -0,04
ISCED  0/1 Mother 
education
18,86 7,48 1,74 32,71 0,96 18,62 2,55 5,54 1,85 4,19
ISECD 2 13,67 13,55 4,63 22,23 4,4 23,56 8,32 20,49 6,89 5,1
ISECD 3 b, c 9,81 8,99 7,33 11,36 18,91 6,48 10,84 28,57 0 7,8
ISCED 3a, 4 20,73 34,08 30,15 11,11 56,53 21,73 16,38 18,99 40,49 19,01
ISCED 5 b 22,42 5,76 33,29 8,16 3,24 9,28 23,82 14,47 22,49 24,7
ISCED 5a, 6 14,51 30,13 22,85 14,43 15,95 20,34 38,1 11,94 28,27 39,2
ISCED  0/1 Father 
education 
15,14 6,93 2,04 32,96 1,04 19,06 4,01 4,58 3,42 4,18
ISECD 2 10,01 11,2 5,75 22,37 2,95 20,35 12,47 17,65 10,99 6,14
ISECD 3 b, c 7,77 7,57 9,04 11,95 26,49 6,27 12,31 25,31 0 9,87
ISCED 3a, 4 26,14 28,69 29,24 10,64 47,78 20,43 16,99 11,9 41,3 16,95
ISCED 5 b 19,52 4,64 25,87 7,91 2,46 11,66 19,87 19,91 16,85 25,26
ISCED 5a, 6 21,42 40,97 28,06 14,16 19,28 22,24 34,35 20,65 27,44 37,6
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland Canada Israel
Mother  SES 
(average)
40,57 43,09 46,7 37,98 44,77 39,74 43,32 41,45 46,71 51,05
Father SES (average) 44,29 48,38 48,42 40,51 42,37 42,64 45,67 44,57 44,33 50
value  reading 
(average)
469,5 521,25 495,83 476,52 473,39 484,93 512,93 494,87 514,45 451,29
Girl schools% 8,59 1,42 0 0 0,15 0,23 0 0,42 0,63 13,4
Boy schools% 0 0 0,01 0,05 1,65 0,91 0 0,11 0,43 9,43
Mixed schools % 91,41 98,58 99,99 99,95 98,2 98,85 100 99,47 98,94 77,16
Social  composition 
(%  parent's  having 
tertiary  education)-
(average)
24,13 48,71 34,71 19,57 24,49 29,34 48,45 24,71 38,29 48,9
School size 1420,93 1005,02 292,24 974,41 554,6 709,66 492,27 455,52 756,66 831,83
Tuition  %  having 
tuition fees
23,86 90,97 38,33 80 14,18 43,85 45,14 48,27 80,43 80,25
Admittance-parent's 
views considered -%
50,6 50,45 31,09 56,57 23,07 44,86 49,28 31,25 28,34 75,02
Admittance-special 
programs considered- 
%
73,54 66,2 44,37 86,04 74,34 53,94 57,42 59,72 72,69 88,91
Teacher-student ratio 9,68 15,79 10,11 9,6 15,12 12,8 12,47 11,95 16,35 13,03
Computer-student 
ratio (average)
0,2 0,17 0,23 0,09 0,07 0,11 0,15 0,17 0,24 151,4
Educational 
resources (average)
0,11 0,27 -0,07 -0,18 -0,67 0,01 0,05 0,33 -0,03 -0,03
Teacher  shortage 
-neg scale (average)
0,63 0,17 0,23 -0,47 -0,15 -0,55 -0,01 -0,23 -0,01 0,07
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for variables entered in the propensity estimation model per country (continued)
Argentina Chile Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Thailand
Private independent 7,25 11,88 0,79 29,38 22,7 6,71
Private-dependent 23,07 39,67 62,12 4,37 28,44 4,32
Public 69,69 48,45 37,09 66,25 48,86 88,97
Gender (% girls) 53,75 49,85 50,4 50,49 44,99 57,56
Grade (average) 9,63 9,68 9,58 9,29 9,99 9,55
Grade (range) 7 to 14 7 to 11 7 to 12 7 to 12 9 to 11 7 to 11
Immigrant (% ) 7,01 1,72 59,91 0,52 0,04 0,78
First generation immigrant (%) 0,95 0,65 21,34 0,21 0 0,1
Second generation immigrant (%) 6,06 1,07 38,57 0,31 0,04 0,69
Foreign language used at home (%) 0,58 0,44 6,22 24,75 0,1 30,51
Index of cultural possessions (Average) -0,07 -0,12 -0,44 -0,6 0,15 -0,1
Family wealth (Average) -1,18 -0,96 -0,33 -1,84 -0,12 -1,22
ISCED 0/1 Mother education 18,1 9,02 26,55 37,05 7,15 41,57
ISECD 2 22,54 18,85 29,58 25,46 14,95 29,89
ISECD 3 b,c 7,82 15,17 23,75 6,32 17,63 4,52
ISCED 3a, 4 9,6 23,93 7,49 20,38 30,87 11,7
ISCED 5 b 19,49 18,29 8,75 3,89 13,1 1,24
ISCED 5a, 6 22,47 14,73 3,89 6,91 16,3 11,09
ISCED 0/1 Father education 19,66 8 23,37 28,78 5,65 36,61
ISECD 2 22,88 17,56 29,35 23,1 11,6 27,7
ISECD 3 b,c 8,62 14,85 23,44 8,79 16,32 6,19
ISCED 3a, 4 10,5 23,55 8,16 23,82 24,83 14,77
ISCED 5 b 17,12 16,97 8,75 4,86 12,64 2,29
ISCED 5a, 6 21,22 19,07 6,93 10,65 28,96 12,43
23
Mother SES (average) 43 33,82 38,04 33,96 41,18 33,34
FATHER SES (average) 41,86 38,69 38,9 34,16 44,37 34,72
value reading (Average) 403,48 432,18 525,45 377,15 536,61 429,48
Girl schools% 1,76 7,16 11,6 0,56 35,32 2,95
Boy schools% 1,2 5,48 5,29 1,44 18,4 0,41
Mixed schools % 97,03 87,36 83,11 98 46,28 96,65
Social composition (% parent's having tertiary education)-
average
31,15 24,27 8,15 13,08 31,3 15,18
School size 631,4 1092,53 1046,02 635,55 1198,09 1687,19
Tuition % having tuition fees 78,74 85,57 89,51 61,22 98,99 46,76
Admittance-parent's views 67,06 62,65 82,33 72,8 40,27 80,39
Admittance-special programs 83,9 77,41 69,22 77,28 60,25 89,26
Teacher-student ratio 10,2 26,91 18,28 18,49 17,72 22,49
Computer-student ratio 80,9 51,68 4,97 19,25 0,25 1,8
Educational resources -0,03 -0,16 0,02 -0,58 0,16 -0,1
Teacher shortage (neg scale) -0,58 0,19 -0,07 0,96 -0,49 0,66
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000, 2003 and 2006; 
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 Table 2: The coefficients of the logistic regression predicting the choice of a private-dependent school relative to a public school per country, 
including tuition.
Regression 
coefficients
Gender Immigra
nt
Foreign 
language 
used  at 
home
Cultural 
possessio
ns
Family 
wealth
Mother 
ISCED
Father 
ISCED
Mother 
SES
Father 
SES
School-
soc 
composit
ion
School 
size
Admissi
on-
parents' 
endorse
ment
Admissi
on- 
special 
program
Student-
teacher 
ratio
Compute
r-student 
ratio
Educatio
nal 
resources
Tuition
EUROPE
Austria  -0,906* 
(0,112)
0,275 
(0,161)
0,400 
(0,226)
0,018 
(0,063)
-0,024 
(0,071)
-0,032 
(0,050)
-0,023 
(0,047)
0,009* 
(0,004)
0,006 
(0,004)
2,17* 
(0,314)
-0,001* 
(0,0002)
2,415* 
(0,132)
-0,826* 
(0,176)
-0,121* 
(0,022)
-3,686* 
(0,600)
0,128* 
(0,052)
3,553* 
(0,236)
Belgium -0,113* 
(0,043)
-0,683* 
(0,054)
0,541* 
(0,072)
0,045 
(0,024)
0,072* 
(0,030)
0,013 
(0,019)
0,022 
(0,019)
0,002* 
(0,001)
0,001 
(0,001)
0,761* 
(0,149)
0,0015* 
(0,000)
1,478* 
(0,050)
-0,082 
(0,050)
-0,024* 
(0,008)
0,763* 
(0,184)
0,319* 
(0,024)
0,620* 
(0,043)
Canada -0,068 
(0,087)
-0,177 
(0,118)
-0,515* 
(0,230)
-0,064 
(0,050)
-0,020 
(0,063)
-0,053 
(0,047)
0,038 
(0,043)
0,007* 
(0,003)
0,008* 
(0,003)
5,710* 
(0,285)
-0,003* 
(0,0001)
3,006* 
(0,115)
-1,031* 
(0,116)
0,110* 
(0,015)
-10,  63* 
(0,658)
0,933* 
(0,045)
Dropped 
‡ 
Czech 
Republic
-0,230* 
(0,098)
0,281 
(0,174)
0,101 
(0,592)
0,055 
(0,056)
0,089 
(0,059)
-0,149* 
(0,063)
-0,097 
(0,060)
0,004 
(0,004)
0,012* 
(0,004)
1,172* 
(0,268)
-0,007* 
(0,0003)
1,498* 
(0,131)
-0,470* 
(0,148)
-0,108* 
(0,015)
-2,866* 
(0,563)
0,119* 
(0,051)
2,510* 
(0,109)
Denmark -0,177 
(0,110)
0,311 
(0,199)
-0,437 
(0,376)
0,219* 
(0,061)
-0,038 
(0,067)
-0,125* 
(0,053)
0,008 
(0,054)
0,010* 
(0,004)
-0,005 
(0,004)
0,989* 
(0,318)
-0,002* 
(0,0003)
2,245* 
(0,152)
-0,910* 
(0,166)
0,030 
(0,026)
2,617* 
(0,508)
0,198* 
(0,069)
5,246* 
(0,124)
Finland -0,084 
(0,102)
0,015 
(0,262)
1,503* 
(0,363)
-0,015 
(0,061)
0,060 
(0,075)
-0,073 
(0,044)
0,020 
(0,043)
0,006* 
(0,003)
0,004 
(0,003)
4,002* 
(0,332)
0,002* 
(0,0003)
-1,149* 
(0,124)
1,531* 
(0,160)
-0,248* 
(0,035)
-12,88* 
(1,022)
0,364* 
(0,064)
2,749* 
(0,214)
France 0,076 
(0,136)
-0,047 
(0,176)
0,942* 
(0,316)
0,145 
(0,075)
-0,022 
(0,102)
-0,045 
(0,063)
-0,013 
(0,060)
-0,0007 
(0,004)
-0,002 
(0,005)
0,319 
(0,492)
-0,0001 
(0,0001)
Dropped 
†
Dropped 
† 
-0,020 
(0,031)
1,200 
(0,783)
0,180* 
(0,075)
-0,219* 
(0,142)
Germany -0,806* 
(0,112)
0,156 
(0,187)
-0,370 
(0,387)
0,217* 
(0,066)
0,345* 
(0,071)
-0,106* 
(0,052)
-0,078 
(0,050)
0,003 
(0,004)
0,014* 
(0,003)
2,312* 
(0,344)
-0,0003 
(0,0002)
4,012* 
(0,251)
-1,117* 
(0,235)
0,062* 
(0,014)
5,539* 
(0,874)
0,143* 
(0,053)
2,229* 
(0,112)
Hungary -0,137 
(0,089)
0,135 
(0,207)
-1,585 
(1,052)
0,056 
(0,057)
-0,032 
(0,062)
0,089 
(0,050)
0,054 
(0,054)
-0,002 
(0,003)
-0,0007 
(0,003)
1,858* 
(0,249)
-0,003* 
(0,0002)
1,806* 
(0,103)
-0,163 
(0,`139)
0,102* 
(0,010)
-1,063* 
(0,285)
0,203* 
(0,054)
-0,408* 
(0,100)
Ireland -0,477* 
(0,065)
-0,017 
(0,091)
-0,149 
(0,332)
0,043 
(0,035)
0,121* 
(0,045)
-0,096* 
(0,026)
0,018 
(0,024)
0,012* 
(0,002)
0,005* 
(0,002)
3,456* 
(0,267)
-0,004* 
(0,0002)
1,546* 
(0,087)
-1,957* 
(0,090)
0,094* 
(0,013)
-21,97* 
(0,888)
-0,294* 
(0,034)
1,708* 
(0,068)
Italy 0,353* 
(0,111)
0,342* 
(0,167)
0,333* 
(0,148)
-0,115 
(0,068)
0,025 
(0,079)
0,018 
(0,048)
-0,004 
(0,048)
0,0002 
(0,004)
-0,014* 
(0,004)
2,224* 
(0,401)
-0,004* 
(0,0003)
1,348* 
(0,124)
-0,662* 
(0,131)
0,006 
(0,020)
0,846* 
(0,268)
0,149* 
(0,057)
-2,975* 
(0,122)
Luxembourg -1,769* 
(0,202)
0,612* 
(0,175)
-0,292 
(0,231)
-0,023 
(0,084)
-0,152 
(0,100)
-0,013 
(0,053)
-0,088 
(0,057)
0,005 
(0,005)
0,016* 
(0,006)
2,794* 
(0,753)
-0,010* 
(0,0005)
7,527* 
(0,420)
-8,054* 
(0,539)
0,024 
(0,078)
-23,28* 
(2,220)
-0,804* 
(0,104)
5,560* 
(0,334)
Netherlands -0,112 
(0,058)
-0,464* 
(0,082)
0,011 
(0,111)
0,040 
(0,034)
0,034 
(0,042)
0,003 
(0,022)
-0,012 
(0,022)
-0,005* 
(0,002)
-0,003 
(0,002)
-0,393* 
(0,185)
0,0000 
(0,0000)
1,343* 
(0,069)
0,085 
(0,067)
-0,005 
(0,008)
1,226* 
(0,457)
0,244* 
(0,031)
0,230* 
(0,095)
Norway 0,390 
(0,249)
1,309* 
(0,371)
-0,163 
(604)
0,949* 
(0,175)
-0,424* 
(0,169)
-0,071 
(0,130)
-0,111 
(0,136)
0,004 
(0,009)
0,034* 
(0,009)
-8,475* 
(0,938)
0,005* 
(0,001)
Dropped 
‡
Dropped 
‡
-0,264* 
(0,078)
3,049* 
(1,022)
-1,415* 
(0,163)
4,001* 
(0,672)
Portugal 0,154 
(0,094)
0,028 
(0,168)
0,370 
(0,364)
0,046 
(0,056)
0,182* 
(0,064)
-0,088* 
(0,038)
-0,091* 
(0,039)
-0,004 
(0,004)
-0,003 
(0,004)
-3,645* 
(0,505)
0,001* 
(0,0000)
2,479* 
(0,161)
-1,748* 
(0,156)
0,107* 
(0,006)
0,380* 
(0,183)
0,350* 
(0,047)
-1,291* 
(0,103)
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Slovakia -0,018 
(0,090)
-0,031 
(0,181)
-0,638 
(0,750)
-0,049 
(0,059)
0,299* 
(0,067)
-0,042 
(0,054)
-0,020 
(0,052)
-0,001 
(0,003)
-0,0000 
(0,003)
2,494* 
(0,249)
-0,004* 
(0,0003)
1,492* 
(0,091)
-0,584* 
(0,101)
-0,013 
(0,016)
-5,768* 
(0,967)
0,359* 
(0,068)
-0,384* 
(0,147)
Spain 0,094 
(0,078)
-0,231 
(0,157)
-0,169 
(0,361)
-0,020 
(0,048)
0,027 
(0,056)
0,029 
(0,027)
-0,027 
(0,027)
0,0036 
(0,003)
-0,004 
(0,003)
0,577* 
(0,265)
-0,001* 
(0,000)
1,631* 
(0,107)
-1,245* 
(0,105)
1,267* 
(0,025)
11,090* 
(0,484)
0,151* 
(0,041)
3,310* 
(0,091)
Sweden -0,177 
(0,111)
0,732* 
(0,148)
0,306 
(0,240)
0,266* 
(0,061)
-0,174* 
(0,074)
-0,154* 
(0,047)
0,004 
(0,044)
0,014* 
(0,003)
0,012* 
(0,004)
4,478* 
(0,384)
-0,020* 
(0,0005)
-1,718* 
(0,152)
0,762* 
(0,137)
0,191* 
(0,015)
0,511 
(0,356)
0,395* 
(0,067)
-0,197 
(0,128)
Switzerland -0,330 
(0,167)
-0,236 
(0,206)
0,013 
(0,333)
0,295* 
(0,093)
-0,154 
(0,116)
-0,236* 
(0,074)
0,108 
(0,069)
0,009 
(0,006)
-0,010 
(0,006)
2,382* 
(0,525)
-0,0007* 
(0,0002)
0,598* 
(0,189)
2,033* 
(0,359)
0,090* 
(0,014)
0,061 
(0,233)
-0,230* 
(0,079)
2,123* 
(0,217)
OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Canada -0,068 
(0,087)
-0,177 
(0,118)
-0,515* 
(0,230)
-0,064 
(0,050)
-0,020 
(0,063)
-0,053 
(0,047)
0,038 
(0,043)
0,007* 
(0,003)
0,008* 
(0,003)
5,710* 
(0,285)
-0,003* 
(0,0001)
3,006* 
(0,115)
-1,031* 
(0,116)
0,110* 
(0,015)
-10,  63* 
(0,658)
0,933* 
(0,045)
Dropped 
‡ 
Israel -0,072 
(0,105)
0,013 
(0,110)
-0,389 
(0,200)
0,139* 
(0,063)
-0,481* 
(0,067)
-0,016 
(0,057)
-0,028 
(0,051)
0,001 
(0,004)
-0,004 
(0,003)
2,871* 
(0,294)
-0,001* 
(0,0001)
0,143 
(0,130)
-0,336* 
(0,156)
-0,012 
(0,013)
-0,008 
(0,020)
0,124* 
(0,052)
0,270 
(0,159)
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina -0,626* 
(0,167)
0,233 
(0,336)
0,760 
(1,004)
-0,164 
(0,100)
0,232* 
(0,107)
0,090 
(0,057)
0,094 
(0,057)
-0,003 
(0,005)
-0,002 
(0,006)
6,365* 
(0,615)
-0,009* 
(0,0006)
2,537* 
(0,279)
-0,565 
(0,322)
0,306* 
(0,024)
18,323* 
(2,896)
-0,064 
(0,072)
Dropped 
‡ 
Chile 0,178* 
(0,076)
-0,124 
(0,294)
-1,423 
(0,774)
0,099* 
(0,047)
0,239* 
(0,053)
0,027 
(0,032)
-0,041 
(0,031)
0,001 
(0,003)
0,005 
(0,003)
2,617* 
(0,329)
-0,001* 
(0,000)
0,680* 
(0,104)
0,225* 
(0,097)
0,074* 
(0,006)
19,362* 
(1,636)
-0,201* 
(0,038)
1,942* 
(0,126)
ASIA
Hong Kong -0,074 
(0,058)
-0,147* 
(0,062)
-0,193 
(0,124)
0,335* 
(0,036)
-0,007 
(0,047)
-0,307* 
(0,026)
-0,226* 
(0,025)
0,019* 
(0,002)
0,012* 
(0,002)
-2,223* 
(0,319)
-0,0006* 
(0,0002)
0,047 
(0,085)
-1,664* 
(0,080)
-0,019 
(0,018)
3,935* 
(0,456)
0,521* 
(0,029)
1,760* 
(0,099)
Indonesia -0,087 
(0,152)
Dropped 
‡
1,264* 
(0,404)
-0,040 
(0,089)
-0,131 
(0,076)
-0,114* 
(0,061)
-0,052 
(0,060)
0,006 
(0,007)
0,004 
(0,007)
-2,294* 
(1,024)
-0,010* 
(0,0006)
-0,578* 
(0,204)
1,301* 
(0,225)
0,112* 
(0,013)
-0,006 
(0,033)
-0,363* 
(0,052)
2,735* 
(0,182)
Korea -0,302* 
(0,062)
0,058 
(1,421)
-2,170 
(1,139)
0,036 
(0,036)
0,053 
(0,043)
0,030 
(0,027)
-0,008 
(0,026)
-0,009* 
(0,002)
0,0002 
(0,002)
-1,230* 
(0,220)
-0,001* 
(0,0000)
0,946* 
(0,095)
-0,094 
(0,066)
0,129* 
(0,019)
-1,192* 
(0,211)
0,063 
(0,034)
3,727* 
(0,718)
Thailand -0,256* 
(0,095)
-1,078 
(1,017)
0,145 
(0,110)
-0,090 
(0,051)
0,366* 
(0,054)
0,012 
(0,043)
-0,185* 
(0,043)
0,005 
(0,005)
0,002 
(0,004)
-4,098* 
(0,449)
0,0005* 
(0,0000)
0,505* 
(0,150)
-0,387* 
(0,175)
-0,007 
(0,009)
3,226* 
(0,944)
0,007 
(0,041)
0,895* 
(0,102)
Regression 
coefficients
Gender Immigra
nt
Foreign 
language 
used  at 
home
Cultural 
possessio
ns
Family 
wealth
Mother 
ISCED
Father 
ISCED
Mother 
SES
Father 
SES
School-
soc 
composit
ion
School 
size
Admissi
on-
parents' 
endorse
ment
Admissi
on- 
special 
program
Student-
teacher 
ratio
Compute
r-student 
ratio
Educatio
nal 
resources
Tuition
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000, 2003 and 2006; †dropped due to be constant for private-dependent schools, ‡ dropped due to perfect  
correlation with other variables
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Table 3: Correlations between coefficients of the logistic regressions (table 2) and belonging to one of the five clusters
Male Immi
grant
Foreign 
language 
used at
home
Cultural
Posses
sions
Family
wealth
Mother
ISCED
Father
ISCED
Mother
SES
Father
SES
School
Socio-
economic
com
position
School
size
Admission
parents'
endor
sement
Admission
Special
program
Teacher
Student
ratio
Computer
Student
ratio
Edu
cational
resources
Tuition
Cluster 
A
-.22 .34 .36 .59* -.08 -.77* .04 .75* .38 .33 -.21 -.20 .21 -.25 -.20 .12 .35
Cluster 
B
.54* -.48
*
-.35 -.51* .17 .72* .03 -.75* -.55* -.39 .35 -.12 .16 .26 .42 .19 -.53*
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000, 2003 and 2006. N=21 (only countries with valid parameters for all variables). * significance <.05 
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 Table 4: Effect of attending a private-dependent school vs. a public school on reading achievement 
Cluster
Simple  reading 
score  difference 
between  private 
and  public 
schools pupils
No  of 
observed 
pupils
Reading  score 
difference  within 
the  common 
range  of 
propensity  scores 
of  private  and 
public  school 
pupils
No  of 
observed 
pupils
Reading  score 
difference  of  the 
private-  nearest 
public  school 
neighbour  in 
propensity scores
No  of  pupils 
(private/ 
public)
Reading  score 
difference  of  the 
private  –public 
school  pupils 
based  on  nearest 
neighbour  and 
Mahalanibis 
distance
No of pupils
 (private/ public)
EUROPE
Austria A 19,39 (3,70)*** 7838 13,47 (3,73)*** 6488 -16,13 (7,51)* (627/389) -8,14 (6,79) (627/417)
Belgium B 39,21 (1,63)*** 13560 38,64 (1,63)*** 13420 27,31 (2,83)*** (9684/ 3735) 24,82 (2,64)*** (9684/ 2529)
Czech 
Republic
A
-3,16 (3,75) 13194 -3,15 (3,75) 9641 12,73 (5,52)* (616/477) 14,03 (5,68)* (616/ 477)
Denmark A 0,33 (2,21) 7353 -2,52 (2,34) 5850 10,96 (7,47) (1723/ 340) 4,60 (6,84) (1723/ 380)
Finland A -2,61 (3,40) 11644 -4,36 (3,44) 9791 -6,17 (7,56) (516/ 374) -14,09 (6,58)* (516/393)
France -0,21 (5,39) 2025 0,14 (5,42) 1940 0,51 (7,44) (261/230) 2,89 (7,61) (261/ 231)
Germany A 44,93 (4,02)*** 7861 43,92 (4,04)*** 7528 23,01 (6,28)** (499/368) 24,03 (6,00)** (499/376)
Hungary B 25,45 (3,19)*** 5772 24,02 (3,18)*** 5669 14,95 (4,99)** (727/ 542) 13,10 (4,77)** (727/555)
Ireland A 33,84 (1,90)*** 7559 29,25 (2,03)*** 6600 12,58 (5,12)* (3971/ 1082) 8,12 (4,02)* (3971/ 1211)
Italy B -41,35 (4,21)*** 17753 -41,19 (4,22) *** 17323 -8,55 (8,85) (468 /323) -19,65 (8,19)* (468/ 339)
Luxembourg -15,92 (3,38)*** 6107 -12,70 (4,48) ** 1345 16,20 (13,87) (729/ 193) 7,13 (10,50) (729/ 220)
Netherlands B -0,29 (2,18) 6793 0,36 (2,18) 6725 10,26 (3,42)** (4939 / 1303) 2,74 (3,26) (4939/ 1366)
Norway 25,78 (9,36)** 2414 20,33 (9,52) * 1664 8,97 (17,30) (96/66) 17,83 (15,20) (96/ 67)
Portugal B -5,89 (3,64) 8858 2,63 (3,75) 6450 20,33 (5,90)** (592/464) 16,33 (5,81)** (592/ 462)
Slovakia B 17,84 (3,50)*** 8062 2,52 (3,87) 7865 0,24 (5,71) (519/442) -6,39 (5,69) (519/ 455)
Spain B 27,11 (1,14)*** 18575 21,86 (1,50) *** 14394 -2,19 (14,17) (3592/ 609) 1,80 (5,71) (3592/ 679)
Sweden A 23,97 (4,04)*** 9190 21,79 (4,13)*** 5637 9,32 (7,94) (459/ 322) 7,95 (6,82) (459/ 336)
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Switzerland A 20,25 (6,63)** 15893 11,25 (6,62) 11034 -8,19 (9,96) (158/152) -2,32 (9,52) (158/155)
OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED
Canada 48,63 (2,92)*** 21606 46,21 (2,94)*** 14702 35,86 (6,14)*** (823/ 543) 31,60 (5,83)*** (823/556)
Israel B 4,42 (4,68) 2462 3,96 (4,72) 2449 1,38 (7,83) (571/ 377) 5,44 (7,27) (571/ 400)
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina 54,33 (4,14)*** 2011 52,95 (5,33)*** 1178 83,36 (17,29)*** (694/ 168) 24,76 (11,23)* (694/203)
Chile B 37,01 (2,85)*** 3718 31,05 (2,96)*** 3470 15,18 (6,14)* (1751/ 747) 23,03 (4,48)*** (1751 / 836)
ASIA
Hong Kong A -8,77 (1,73)*** 7872 -7,02 (1,77)*** 7704 -5,76 (3,75) (5120/ 1255) -4,39 (3,11) (5120/ 1341)
Indonesia -29,32 (3,91)*** 4099 -9,92 (4,15)* 1924 -15,36 (7,93) (298/ 170) 0,15 (7,47) (298/ 187)
Korea B -2,36 (2,31) 5034 -1,54 (2,33) 4932 -6,44 (3,43) (2073/ 1172) -6,45 (3,15)* (2073/ 1265)
Thailand B -23,63 (3,30)*** 11196 -22,60 (3,37) *** 11009 -31,71 (4,72)*** (510/ 462) -21,39 (4,58)*** (510/ 454)
Source: pooled data PISA dataset for 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
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1 This article is one of the products of the cross-national project „Religious education in a multicultural society: School 
and home in comparative context”, directed by Emer Smith (Economic & Social Research Institute, Dublin) and 
financed by the European Commision within the 7th Frame Work (FP7-SSH-2007-1- REMC). 
2 In subsequent studies, we will compare the choice/effectiveness gaps between public and private-independent schools, 
as well as compare school effects concerning student attitudes on environmental issues and school climate.
3 We use for the description of this technique the article of Frisco, Muller & Frank (2007), who use this technique in 
their analysis of the effects of parental divorce on children’s well-being.
4 We use nearest neighbour and nearest neighbour with Mahalanobis distance matching;
5 Normally, this should not be a big problem; see Morgan & Winship (2007)
6 The PISA survey does not distinguish between denominational and non-denominational schools.
7 We could only use the first PISA wave for France, because the public data set of the second and third PISA wave do 
not contain valid values for French public and private school indicator. We have to assume that this private-public 
distinction has become a state-secret, too annoying for the secular French Republic to be published.
8 There were too few charter schools in the USA (which are considered by PISA as private-dependent schools) to be  
included.
9 While this admission based on programs is necessary for all French and Norwegian private-dependent schools.
10 This is a negative coefficient in table 2, because the variable is the student-teacher ratio.
11 Based on country of birth of (one of) the parents outside the country of birth and/or the foreign language used at 
home.
12 Given the different measurement scales of variables, we multiplied the coefficient by the existing range in the sample 
to compute a maximum effect; also-the analysis uses the Gower measure and the Ward’s method of clustering;
13 We had to delete from the cluster analysis those countries (Argentina, Canada, France, Indonesia, Norway) for which 
not all parameters are available.
14 Luxembourg is clearly a separate case, which has a few in common with the two clusters.
15 Information about the characteristics of the matched treated and control pupils and their parents is available from the 
first author.
